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WHAT ABOUT WHITMAN?: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION IN EPA V. HOMER TO 
AUTHORIZE COST CONSIDERATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
CONTRADICTS ITS OWN PRECEDENT 
DEVON APPLEGATE* 
Abstract: In 2011, in response to the ongoing problem of interstate air pollu-
tion, EPA promulgated the Transport Rule to restrict emissions in upwind 
states in order to achieve attainment of certain national ambient air quality 
standards in downwind states. State and local governments and industry and 
labor groups, unhappy with EPA’s process of determining which states would 
be regulated under the Transport Rule, challenged the rule on the grounds that 
EPA had exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act. In 2014, in EPA v. 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the Transport Rule is a permissible construction of the Good Neigh-
bor Provision of the Clean Air Act. This Comment argues that the Transport 
Rule, because it permits cost consideration in determining emission reductions 
for upwind states with no textual authority to do so, is an impermissible inter-
pretation of the Good Neighbor Provision by EPA. The Court’s holding in 
Homer authorizes EPA to force states to implement any measures it deems 
cost-effective, even if the measures require states to decrease their emissions 
by more than their share of pollution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Environmentalist groups celebrated and applauded the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P. as a victory for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and envi-
ronmental protection generally.1 Individuals paying electric bills in upwind 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 See Jonathan H. Adler, Further Thoughts on the EME Homer City Decision, WASH. POST (May 
2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/02/further-thoughts-
on-the-eme-homer-city-decision/, archived at http://perma.cc/6QGF-GD4U. In a statement released 
on April 29, 2014, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy stated, “[t]oday’s Supreme Court decision is a 
resounding victory for public health and a key component of EPA’s efforts to make sure all Ameri-
cans have clean air to breathe.” Andrew Childers, Challenges Remain Despite Supreme Court Deci-
sion Reinstating EPA Cross-State Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.bna.com/
challenges-remain-despite-n17179890025/, archived at http://perma.cc/T8ZE-NJXR. 
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states, however, may not be as enthusiastic about the holding.2 Brian Potts, 
an attorney who represented an electric and gas utility in the case, explained 
that as a result of the decision, EPA may add a new charge to monthly elec-
tric bills in states that send air pollution downwind.3 He referred to the new 
charge as EPA’s “good-neighbor fee.” 4  According to Potts, the “good-
neighbor fee” is the amount that must be paid to clean up the pollution emit-
ted from the bill payer’s state, which travels to neighboring states.5 
The specific rule at issue in Homer is the Cross State Air Pollution 
Rule, also known as the Transport Rule, which utilizes a cost-based ap-
proach to regulate interstate air pollution.6 Under the Transport Rule as it 
stands, the fee for residents in lesser polluting states could be higher than 
the fee for those in higher polluting states.7 Potts contends that the Rule is 
unfair because it can require a lesser polluting state to reduce its pollution 
more than a higher polluting state simply because it is cheaper for the lesser 
polluting state to do so.8 He stated that “[i]f you live in a lesser-polluting 
state—such as New York, Iowa, [or] South Carolina[—] . . . your good 
neighbor fee is higher than it would be if the EPA were simply comparing 
cross-state emission levels.”9 
This Comment argues that although the Transport Rule is arbitrary in 
its operation, it should have been invalidated on the ground that EPA ex-
ceeded its statutory authority by promulgating the rule.10 Specifically, EPA 
impermissibly interpreted the Good Neighbor Provision (“GNP”) of the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by promulgating the Transport Rule, which consid-
ers costs in determining emission reductions for upwind states.11 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
If interstate air pollution is left unregulated, upwind states reap the 
benefits of economic activity that causes downwind pollution, without bear-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Brian H. Potts, The EPA’s Golden Rule: No Good Neighbor Goes Unpunished, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 20, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303932504579
258291708181228, archived at http://perma.cc/89LW-YSCL. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. (Homer II), 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014); 
Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Cor-
rection of SIP Approvals (Transport Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,208–09 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 72, 78, 97). 
 7 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1593. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Thus, the rule may arbitrarily hurt certain upwind states. Id. 
 10 See infra notes 73–113 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 73–113 and accompanying text. 
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ing the costs.12 Furthermore, downwind states are unable to attain cleaner 
air due to the pollution emitted from upwind states.13 To address this prob-
lem, Congress included the GNP in the CAA, and pursuant to it, EPA 
adopted the Transport Rule.14 The GNP requires states to prohibit in-state 
sources “from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contrib-
ute significantly” to downwind states’[s] “nonattainment . . . , or interfere 
with maintenance,” of any EPA-promulgated national air quality standard.15 
Using the GNP as its authority, EPA promulgated the Transport Rule in 
August 2011.16 The Rule embraces a two-step process.17 First, EPA decides 
which states to cover by evaluating each state’s significant contribution to 
nonattainment in downwind states.18 To evaluate state contributions, EPA 
uses air quality models to identify downwind areas of nonattainment for 
certain national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”).19 EPA then iden-
tifies upwind states that contribute more than one percent of the applicable 
NAAQS to one or more downwind states.20 In the second step, EPA deter-
mines the emissions budgets for the contributing states.21 It calculates the 
quantity of emissions a state could eliminate at multiple cost thresholds,22 
and generates complex models to “establish the combined effect the upwind 
reductions projected at each cost threshold would have on air quality in 
downwind states.”23 Then based on these models, EPA identifies the cost 
thresholds where a “noticeable change occurred in downwind air quality, 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1592–93 (2014); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Inter-
state Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996). 
 13 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1592–93. In a 1989 Senate Report, the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works pointed to interstate travel of air pollution as a significant reason 
for the non-attainment of air quality standards in downwind states. See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 48, 
289 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3434, 3672. 
 14 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012); Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1593; Transport Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208–09. 
 15 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(D)(i). 
 16 Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208–09; see Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1592–93 (noting 
that EPA relied on the GNP in promulgating the Transport Rule). 
 17 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1596. 
 18 Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,236–37; see Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1596; Jeremy 
Feigenbaum, Becoming Good Neighbors After EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 38 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 265 (2014). 
 19 Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,236–37; Respondents’ Certificate of Counsel at 17, 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-
1302); Feigenbaum, supra note 18, at 265. 
 20 Respondents’ Certificate of Counsel, supra note 23, at 17; see Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1596 
(noting that if a state contributes less than the one percent threshold it would be exempt from regu-
lation under the Transport Rule). 
 21 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1597. 
 22 Id. at 1596; see Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,248–49 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 72, 78, 97). 
 23 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1596; see Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,249. 
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such as . . . where large upwind emission reductions become available be-
cause a certain type of emissions control strategy becomes cost-effective.”24 
It then converts the chosen cost thresholds into required emissions reduc-
tions for upwind states.25 
State and local governments and industry and labor groups petitioned 
for review of the Transport Rule in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit.26 The Transport Rule treats all regulated upwind states alike, re-
gardless of their individual contribution to the larger problem.27 According 
to the petitioners, cost thresholds would require states to decrease their 
emissions by more than their share of downwind-state pollution.28 Petition-
ers further challenge that because EPA’s emission budgets were based upon 
cost alone, EPA failed to protect upwind states from sharing the burden of 
reducing other upwind states’ emissions.29 
On August 21, 2012, the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s Transport Rule in 
a two-to-one split decision.30 The court cited its holding in North Carolina 
v. EPA in concluding that a state must bear sole responsibility for eliminat-
ing its own significant contributions to nonattainment and that no state may 
be required to reduce its interstate emissions by more than the amount of its 
own contributions.31 During the cost analysis phase of the Transport Rule, 
EPA ignores the floor threshold it establishes in the first phase.32 This opens 
the door for the possibility that a state “may be required to reduce its emis-
sions by an amount greater than the ‘significant contribution’ that brought it 
into the program in the first place.”33 Furthermore, a state may be required 
to reduce its emissions by more than it contributes to nonattainment in 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1596; see Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,249. 
 25 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1597. 
 26 See EME Homer City Generation, L.P., v. EPA (Homer I), 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to EPA 
rulemaking pursuant to the CAA. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012); see Cory Lewis, One-Step For-
ward: The D.C. Circuit Provides Clarity to the Incremental Approach to Rulemaking, 41 B.C. EN-
VTL. AFF. L. REV. 541, 545 (2014). 
 27 See Homer I, 696 F.3d at 23. 
 28 See id. (noting that cost thresholds are not based on the amount of pollution an upwind state 
contributes to a downwind state). 
 29 Id. at 26. 
 30 See id. at 11, 12. 
 31 See id. at 14–15 (citing North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Bryan 
Dooley, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA: The Search for Meaningful Regulation of 
Interstate Pollution Under the Clean Air Act, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 893, 909–10 (2013) 
(explaining in detail the D.C. Circuit’s holding). 
 32 See Homer I, 696 F.3d at 24; Dooley, supra note 31, at 910. 
 33 Homer I, 696 F.3d at 25. 
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downwind states.34 Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, EPA exceeded its 
authority under the CAA.35 
According to the court, EPA used the GNP as a mechanism to force 
states to implement whatever measures the agency deemed cost-effective.36 
The court embraced the premise established by the Supreme Court in Whit-
man v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., that Congress would not “‘al-
ter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme . . . in ‘ancillary provi-
sions’ or ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”37 The court was thus confident 
that Congress would not delegate an authority with great economic and po-
litical significance in such a cryptic manner.38 
On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the 
D.C. Circuit accurately construed EPA’s authority under the CAA by pro-
hibiting cost consideration under the Transport Rule.39 On April 29, 2014, 
the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.40 The Court issued four holdings: (1) EPA is 
not required to give states a second opportunity to file a State Implementa-
tion Plan after promulgating each state’s emission budget under the CAA; 
(2) the GNP grants EPA authority to determine how to divide responsibility 
for reducing emissions among downwind states; (3) the Transport Rule was 
a permissible construction of the GNP; and (4) although the Transport Rule 
might exceed EPA’s authority, the entire Rule will not be invalidated on 
these grounds.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past fifty years, Congress has tried vigorously to combat in-
terstate air pollution.42 In 1970, it amended the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) by 
directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish national 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Dooley, supra note 31, at 910 (noting that the obligations imposed on upwind states by 
the GNP must not “go beyond what is necessary for the downwind States to achieve the 
NAAQS”). Cf. Homer I, 696 F.3d at 14–15 (noting that the CAA requires “every upwind State to 
clean up at most its own share of the air pollution in a downwind State—not other States’ shares”). 
 35 See Homer I, 696 F.3d at 11; Julie D. Carter, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA: 
The D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Another EPA Attempt to Make Good Neighbors Through Interstate 
Air Pollution Regulation, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 128 (2012). 
 36 See Homer I, 696 F.3d at 28; Feigenbaum, supra note 18, at 269. 
 37 See Homer I, 696 F.3d at 28 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 
457, 468 (2001)). 
 38 See id. (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 160 (2000)). 
 39 Homer I, 696 F.3d 7, cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1182); 
see Homer II, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1599 (2014) (noting the subject matter of the Court’s review). 
 40 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1610. 
 41 See id. at 1609–10. 
 42 See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. (Homer II), 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (2014). 
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ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) for pollutants at levels that will 
protect public health.43 The CAA also requires EPA to designate nonattain-
ment areas—areas where the concentration of a regulated pollutant exceeds 
the NAAQS.44 Under the CAA, each state must submit a State Implementa-
tion Plan (“SIP”)—in compliance with the NAAQS—to EPA within three 
years of any new or revised NAAQS.45 A SIP must include adequate provi-
sions that prohibit an upwind state from emitting amounts of air pollutants 
that “contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with mainte-
nance by, any other state with respect to any . . . [NAAQS].”46 This re-
quirement is known as the Good Neighbor Provision (“GNP”).47 
EPA promulgated its first interstate pollution plan in 1998. 48  The 
plan—known as the NOX SIP Call—created a two-step process to determine 
the amount of an upwind states’s pollution that had significantly contributed 
to a downwind states’s noncompliance with NAAQS.49 The first step was to 
determine if an upwind state contributed certain amounts of pollutants to a 
downwind state that had failed to meet CAA ozone standards.50 If a state 
passed this threshold requirement, it was required to participate in a desig-
nated program.51 Costs were taken into account in determining how much 
of each state’s pollution budget was to be allocated to the program.52 
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in Michigan v. 
EPA, upheld the NOX SIP Call in a two-to-one split decision.53 States and 
environmental groups had challenged the rule by arguing that the CAA pro-
hibits EPA from considering costs when implementing the GNP.54 The peti-
tioners argued that because the CAA mentions air quality as a factor to be 
used in determinations of “significant contributions” and does not mention 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679–1680 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409 (2012)). 
 44 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (2012). 
 45 If EPA determines that a state has not submitted an adequate SIP, the CAA requires the 
agency to implement a Federal Implementation Plan onto the state within two years of the deter-
mination. See id. § 7410(a)(1), (c)(1). 
 46 Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
 47 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1595. 
 48 See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone 
(NOX SIP Call), 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,358 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
72, 75, 96). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Id.; see Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 52 See NOX SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,358. 
 53 213 F.3d at 690. 
 54 See id. at 674. 
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cost, the cost-of-criterion was unlawful.55 Contrary to this interpretation, the 
court deferred to EPA’s interpretation and authorized the use of costs in im-
plementing the provision, stating “there is nothing in the text, structure, or 
history of [the CAA GNP] that bars EPA from considering cost in its appli-
cation.”56 The D.C. Circuit based its deferral on the Supreme Court’s now-
famous holding in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., which instructs that “[i]f . . . [a] court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . .”57 
EPA promulgated a second interstate pollution plan in 2005.58 This 
plan—known as the Clean Air Interstate Rule (“CAIR”)—also created a 
two-step process to determine the amounts of upwind states’ pollution that 
contribute significantly to downwind states’ noncompliance with NAAQS.59 
Similar to the NOX SIP Call, CAIR required states to first pass a threshold 
test in order to be deemed a significant contributor to downwind nonattain-
ment.60 If a state contributed a certain level of pollution, the state was re-
quired to participate in a designated program.61 Costs were again considered 
in determining each state’s pollution budget.62 
States and environmental groups challenged various aspects of CAIR 
including its consideration of costs.63 In 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded CAIR, finding that EPA had exceeded 
its statutory authority. 64  The court relied on the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., which 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id.; see also Carter, supra note 35, at 126 (reviewing the petitioners’ claims in Michi-
gan v. EPA). 
 56 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d at 679; Carter, supra note 35, at 126. Courts routinely defer 
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. See generally Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (encapsulating the stand-
ard for judicial deference to administrative agency statutory interpretation upon ambiguity). 
57 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Court further held that, “[t]he power of an administra-
tive agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formula-
tion of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” Id. 
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 58 Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Inter-
state Rule), 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 
77, 78, 96). 
 59 Id. at 25,162, 25,165; see North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 903–04 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(considering a challenge to the legality of CAIR). 
 60 Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,162. 
 61 See id. at 25,174–75, 25,191. 
 62 See id. at 25,174–75. 
 63 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 901, 903. 
 64 See id. at 929–30; Feigenbaum, supra note 18, at 264. 
8 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:E. Supp. 
held that EPA cannot “go over the edge of reasonable interpretation.”65 In 
2001, in Whitman, the Supreme Court held that section 109(a) of the CAA 
does not permit EPA to consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS.66 
Section 109(b)(1) instructs EPA to set primary ambient air quality stand-
ards, “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect 
the public health.” 67  The Court reasoned that the CAA often explicitly 
grants EPA authority to consider implementation costs, and thus, where the 
authority is not express, the inference will not be made.68 Numerous other 
provisions in the CAA expressly permit or require costs to be taken into 
account in implementing air quality standards.69 Additionally, provisions of 
the CAA have been amended to explicitly direct the EPA Administrator to 
consider costs.70 The Whitman Court found “it implausible that Congress 
would give to . . . EPA[,] through . . . modest words[,] the power to deter-
mine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality 
standards.”71 The language of the statute is absolute and the Court did not 
find that ambiguous sections of the CAA implicitly granted EPA authority 
to consider costs.72 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in EPA v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., held that the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) Good Neighbor 
Provision (“GNP”), which delegates authority to the Environmental Protec-
                                                                                                                           
 65 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 910 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001)) (explaining that EPA could not read its own substantive provision 
into the CAA). 
 66 See 531 U.S. at 471. 
 67 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
 68 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467 (citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976)). 
 69 Id. In Whitman, the Court noted, 
Section 111(b)(1)(B), for example, commanded the Administrator to set “standards 
of performance” for certain new sources of emissions that as specified in [section] 
111(a)(1) were to “reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the 
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the 
cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.” Section 202(a)(2) prescribed that emissions standards for automo-
biles could take effect only “after such period as the Administrator finds necessary 
to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appro-
priate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.” 
Id. at 467. 
 70 See id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(k)(1), 7547(a)(3)). 
 71 Id. at 468. 
 72 See id. at 467; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984) (outlining the levels of deference federal courts must show to administrative 
agencies). 
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tion Agency (EPA) to determine how to allocate responsibility for a down-
wind state’s pollution in excess of national ambient air quality standards 
(“NAAQS”), gave EPA the authority to consider costs when promulgating 
the Transport Rule, governing the amount of emissions that can flow from 
other upwind states.73 The Court rejected the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit’s determination that the GNP requires upwind states to disre-
gard costs and reduce emissions in a manner proportional to their contribu-
tion to pollution in downwind states.74 The Court reasoned that, based on 
the plain language of the statute, that EPA was neither required no prohibit-
ed from considering costs.75 The Court thus upheld the Transport Rule as a 
reasonable interpretation of a statutory ambiguity in the GNP—under Chev-
ron deference—because the GNP does not command a cost-blind construc-
tion.76 
The Court essentially interpreted congressional silence as a delegation 
of authority to EPA to consider and choose from reasonable methods.77 
EPA’s task under the CAA is to reduce upwind pollution in “amounts” that 
cause a downwind state’s pollution concentrations to exceed the established 
NAAQS.78 EPA was tasked with determining how to “allocate among mul-
tiple contributing upwind [s]tates responsibility for a downwind [s]tate’s 
excess pollution.”79 In the Court’s view, EPA sensibly chose to reduce the 
amounts that are easier and less costly to eradicate, a choice, it held, not 
precluded by the text of the GNP.80 
Contrary to the Court’s opinion, however, the statutory ambiguity at is-
sue in Chevron is unlike that in Homer.81 Unlike in Chevron, the statute is 
not at all ambiguous about whether “amounts” of pollution that “contribute 
significantly” include costs of compliance. 82  The Court read Congress’s 
silence in Chevron as a delegation of authority to EPA to choose from rea-
sonable interpretations of the term “source.”83 In Homer, the Court read 
                                                                                                                           
 73 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. (Homer II), 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1592–94 (2014); 
see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012). 
 74 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1592–94 (reversing the D.C. Circuit’s judgment that only a 
consideration of proportional responsibility was allowed in the Transport Rule, by the GNP). 
 75 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410; Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1604. 
 76 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1592–94, 1603–04. 
 77 See id. at 1589 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)). 
 78 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410; Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1603–04. 
 79 Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1603–04. 
 80 Id. at 1607. 
 81 Compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 
(1984) (considering EPA’s interpretation of a single ambiguous statutory term), with Homer II, 
134 S. Ct. at 1604 (considering whether EPA read a substantive provision into the CAA). 
 82 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012); Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1604 (majority opinion) (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, and 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45). 
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Congress’s silence as a delegation of authority to EPA to choose among rea-
sonable methods to determine “amounts” that “significantly contribute.”84 
EPA argued that the word “significant” is ambiguous and thus it de-
serves deference in its interpretation of the GNP.85 Even if “significant” is 
ambiguous, the word should not “be interpreted to include emissions for 
which a state is not individually responsible.”86 Congress intended that the 
creation of State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) be an individual duty be-
stowed upon states, not a collective duty among multiple states.87 In arguing 
that “significant” is ambiguous, EPA relied on the D.C. Circuit’s holding in 
Michigan v. EPA to support its interpretation.88 Although the court in Mich-
igan v. EPA held that the word “significant” is ambiguous within the mean-
ing of the GNP, the D.C. Circuit did not hold that this ambiguity permitted 
EPA to force a state to reduce its emissions by more than its own contribu-
tion to another state’s nonattainment.89 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Homer is also difficult to under-
stand in light of Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. and the 
D.C. Circuit’s reliance on Whitman in its own holding in North Carolina v. 
EPA. 90 Cost is not mentioned explicitly or implicitly in the GNP. 91 The 
Court transmogrified a statute that assigns responsibility on the basis of 
amounts of pollutants to authorize EPA to reduce interstate pollution in the 
most efficient manner.92 In his dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized that Con-
gress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in 
vague terms or ancillary provisions.”93 In light of the statute’s history, Jus-
tice Scalia believed that “significantly” in the context of contributing to 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. at 1603–04. 
 85 Brandon Dittman, How to Be a Good Neighbor: The Failure of CAIR and CSAPR, Uncer-
tainty, and the Way Forward, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 221 
(2014). 
 86 Id. at 222. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 674–79 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Dittman, supra note 85, at 
222. 
 90 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 910, 929 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008)) (noting that agencies are not to read substantive provisions into statutes). 
 91 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that respondents must 
show a clear textual commitment of authority to EPA to consider costs in setting standards); North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 919 (quoting Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 
847, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (finding that EPA must act within the bounds of its statutory authority 
and must not “substitute new goals in place of the statutory objectives without explaining how 
[doing so comports with] the statute”). 
 92 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 
(holding that EPA has no authority to consider costs because Congress does not vaguely write 
statutes to allow agencies to alter the statute’s fundamental aspects). 
 93 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468). 
2015] The Supreme Court’s Decision in Homer Contradicts Its Decision in Whitman 11 
non-attainment downwind “is not code for feel free to consider compliance 
costs.”94 There are numerous CAA provisions that explicitly permit costs to 
be taken into account. 95 In fact, the CAA is textually quite clear. 96 The 
Court in Whitman required a textual commitment granting authority to EPA 
to consider costs and the GNP drastically fails to meet this requirement.97 
The holding in Homer is thus irreconcilable with the holding in Whitman.98 
The majority attempted to reconcile the differences between Homer 
and Whitman by finding that the relevant text of the GNP is not absolute 
and does not preclude other considerations. 99 The language of the GNP 
grants EPA discretion to eliminate “amounts [of pollution that] . . . contrib-
ute significantly to nonattainment downwind.”100 The majority stated that 
the statute is silent on the particular “amounts” that qualify for elimina-
tion.101 Thus, “unlike the provision at issue in Whitman which provides ex-
press criteria by which EPA is to set NAAQS, the GNP . . . fails to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See id. 
 95 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404(a)(1), 7521(a)(2) (stating that automobile emission standards are 
only effective “after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development 
and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compli-
ance within such period”), 7545(c)(2), 7547(a)(3) (permitting emission reduction standards for non-
road vehicles to be set based upon cost consideration), 7554(b)(2), 7571(b), 7651c(f)(1)(A); Homer 
II, 134 S. Ct. at 1616; see also 42 U.S.C. 7545(k)(1) (granting the power to reformulate gasoline 
to require reductions in emissions by considering the cost of achieving the reductions); Whitman, 
531 U.S. at 467 (finding that other provisions in the CAA expressly permit or require agencies to 
consider costs in implementing air quality standards). The Court in Whitman cites section 111 of 
the CAA, which states that the Administrator must set emission standards for new sources that 
“reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system 
of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Admin-
istrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1); Whitman, 531 
U.S. at 467. Other sections of the CAA have similar limiting language as it applies to interim 
standards, fuel additives, and aircraft emission standards, respectively. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 
7545, 7571. 
 96 See Supreme Court Leading Case Comment, Clean Air Act—Cost Considerations—EPA v. 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 128 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358 (2014). 
 97 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468. 
 98 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority “turns 
its back upon” Whitman). Compare id. at 1607 (majority opinion) (holding that the CAA’s GNP, 
which does not expressly permit cost consideration, permits EPA to consider costs in setting emis-
sion reduction standards), with Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that the relevant text of the 
CAA, which does not expressly permit cost consideration, prohibits EPA from considering costs 
in setting NAAQS). Further, the decision is inconsistent with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in North 
Carolina v. EPA, where the court reasoned that EPA is not permitted to “just pick a cost for a 
region, and deem ‘significant’ any emissions that sources can eliminate more cheaply” because 
this approach does not necessarily prohibit sources within a state from contributing significantly to 
nonattainment in downwind states. See 531 F.3d 896, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 99 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1607 n.21. 
 100 42 U.S.C. § 7410; see Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1607 n.21. 
 101 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1607 n.21. 
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any metric by which EPA can differentiate among the contributions of mul-
tiple upwind states.”102 
The majority attempted to articulate a distinction between setting 
NAAQS at levels “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate 
margin of safety” in Whitman, and eliminating “amounts [that] . . . contribute 
significantly to nonattainment downwind” in Homer.103 It stated that the text 
of the provision in Whitman, unlike the text of the GNP, was absolute and 
provided express criteria for setting standards.104 The distinction between the 
relevant statutory language in Whitman that the majority describes as absolute 
and the text of the GNP, which the majority views as ambiguous, is unclear 
and unconvincing. 105  Whether the D.C. Circuit’s proportional allocation 
method is a permissible and feasible interpretation of the GNP will remain 
unknown for now.106 The current method of apportionment under the Transport 
Rule, however, is not a permissible construction of the statute.107 
The Court’s decision in Homer is a blatant challenge to its own prece-
dent in Whitman.108 Nothing in the GNP expressly precludes cost considera-
tion and thus the majority’s holding in Homer will open the doors for ad-
ministrative agencies to exercise broader lawmaking authority than what 
was delegated to them by Congress.109 The decision begs the question: Is 
EPA’s power limitless? 
The Court has not only left this question unanswered, but it has also 
produced inconsistent case law that will lead to greater uncertainty.110 The 
decision “signals a troubling shift toward the permissibility of cost consid-
erations in environmental regulation.”111 Were the overarching goal of the 
GNP to decrease air pollution in the most cost-effective manner, rather than 
to allocate obligations based on the proportion of each state’s contribution, 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457, 465, 471). 
 104 See id. (citing Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457, 465, 471). 
 105 See id. at 1616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the relevant statutory language, not as 
express and absolute, but as modest and vague, and stating that Congress would not give EPA the 
power to consider costs in determining air quality standards through modest words); Whitman, 531 
U.S. at 468. 
 106 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1589 (vacating the D.C. Circuit’s decision, which required 
proportional allocation of emissions reduction). See generally EME Homer City Generation, L.P., v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency (Homer I), 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (outlining 
a proportional allocation method). 
 107 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1621 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468; North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 918 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 108 See Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1616 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468; North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d at 918. 
 109 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012); Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 110 Compare Homer II, 134 S. Ct. at 1609–10 (majority opinion) (allowing EPA’s use of cost 
considerations), with Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (invalidating EPA’s use of cost considerations). 
 111 Supreme Court Leading Case Comment, supra note 96, at 351. 
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the holding in Homer would perhaps be more understandable.112 The statu-
tory text does not, however, lend support for such a goal.113 
CONCLUSION 
Where the Supreme Court of the United States will draw the line and 
limit the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) authority under the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) remains to be seen. According to the Court’s deci-
sion in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., EPA is permitted to con-
sider the costs of reducing emissions when promulgating rules governing 
the amount of emissions that can flow from one state to another. The deci-
sion in Homer is irreconcilable with the Court’s precedent. The Court at-
tempted to craft a coherent, outcome determinative distinction between the 
facts in Homer and Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., but 
no such distinction existed. 
EPA improperly used the Good Neighbor Provision (“GNP”) of the 
CAA as an instrument to force states to implement any measures the agency 
deems cost-effective in the context of its 2011 Transport Rule. The CAA’s 
legislative history and numerous provisions that explicitly permit cost to be 
considered, however, do not warrant EPA’s cost consideration under the 
Transport Rule. The Court, as it did in Whitman, should have required a 
textual commitment by Congress to grant such authority to consider costs. 
Had it done so, the vacatur of the Transport Rule as an impermissible con-
struction of the GNP by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
would have been upheld and Congress’s intent in passing the CAA GNP 
would have been honored. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Adler, supra note 1. 
 113 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410; Adler, supra note 1. 
